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Abstract 
 
This paper deals with two hypotheses about factors influencing attitudes toward immigration 
in Germany. The first looks at how individuals’ perceptions of their financial and job situation 
affect public opinion on immigration. The second hypothesis tests how these attitudes are 
affected by the beneficial/detrimental effect of immigration on the individual and constitutes 
the paper’s central contribution to the literature. The findings presented here offer direct evi-
dence through the use of data from the German Socio-Economic-Panel (SOEP), in contrast to 
the indirect measures such as education and income employed in most empirical tests to date.  
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1  Introduction 
Research on immigration and especially on the integration of immigrants deals with numerous 
issues surrounding the ability of immigrants to adapt culturally and socially to the “receiving” 
society. However, integration does not necessarily mean that the effort should come solely 
from the immigrants. Rather, it should be seen as a sort of business undertaking, which is 
governed by the principle of reciprocity and in which both groups (immigrants and native 
population) adapt and change. This point of view has been developed in concrete terms at the 
institutional level in the conclusions of the European Council of November 2004. The minis-
ters of Justice and Home Affairs formulated eleven basic principles for the integration of 
immigrants. One of these focuses on the idea that both agents in this process –  natives and 
immigrants – have to contribute to integration (Council of the European Union 2004). Coun-
try-specific attitudes toward immigration in general, and towards specific immigrant groups in 
particular, may even influence the process itself or the willingness of some immigrants to 
integrate. According to Swiss sociologist Hoffmann-Nowotny, the willingness of guest work-
ers to assimilate and the assimilation process itself are primarily a function of the willingness 
of the receiving country to foster their integration (Hoffmann-Nowotny 1987).  
The integration willingness of a society can be measured using different indicators, for exam-
ple,  how  open  or  closed  the  social  classes  of  the  host  society  are,  in  order  to  determine 
whether and to what extent immigrants and their children are able to improve their social 
situation in the receiving country. The degree of acceptance among natives toward immigra-
tion and immigrants also provides information about the willingness of the receiving society 
to incorporate them. The way immigrants and their families are viewed by the majority group 
may play a determining role in integration, affecting the aspect of identification in particular. 
The  native  population’s  acceptance/rejection  of  immigration  and  their  opinions  on  issues 
related to immigrants are hence important aspects of the integration debate. This paper offers 
new pieces of the “successful integration puzzle” that can help us to analyze and interpret 
factors that promote the acceptance of immigration by the native population.  
Extensive research on opinion formation has been conducted in a variety of countries, mostly 
by sociologists and political scientists. In this tradition, the present study deals with two as-
pects that may play a determining role in immigration opinions. The first is based on the so-Discussion Papers   484 
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called  “modernization  losers  hypothesis”,  which  states  that  population  groups  with  a  low 
social status tend to be more right-wing politically and, as a result, more reluctant to accept 
immigrants and immigration. For them, immigrants may be direct competitors, for example 
on the labour or housing market. In this paper, we extend the hypothesis to include the aspect 
of subjective perception, assuming that the way people perceive their own lives is important 
in explaining their negative or positive attitudes toward immigration.  
The second aspect is whether people perceive immigration as producing advantages or disad-
vantages for them personally. The assumption is that direct profiting from immigration by 
benefiting from cheap immigrant labour – in particular services – has a positive impact on 
opinion formation and attitudes toward immigration. Furthermore, people who think they are 
disadvantaged personally by immigration will tend to harbour reservations about it. The cen-
tral issue in this hypothesis is whether or not self-interest interacts with opinion formation on 
immigration.  
This paper contributes to the existing literature with a more direct test of the hypothesis on 
how benefits/detriments resulting from immigration affect acceptance/rejection of immigra-
tion than is known in the current literature. Whereas most empirical tests can use only indirect 
measures for benefits such as education and income1, the data used in this paper from the 
German Socio-Economic-Panel (SOEP) allow us to use more direct indicators. Although even 
these indicators are not ideal, they provide meaningful results for future in-depth research. 
The paper starts with a short description of immigration in Germany, followed by a discussion 
of some related empirical findings from the research on opinion formation. The theoretical 
framework and the hypotheses on determinants of immigration acceptance are then described. 
The last sections of the paper present and discuss the research results. 
                                                                        
1 Foreign immigrants are on average less qualified, and those who are highly qualified often face the problem of 
the non-transferability of their human capital on the labour market of the receiving country. In this sense, natives 
have an advantage as far as their human capital is concerned. As to the effects on income, immigration leads to 
the reassignment of the nationals to more attractive sectors, which results in better-paid employment (OECD 
2001).  Discussion Papers   484 
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2  Immigration to Germany and attitudes towards immigration 
Germany has always relied on immigration, and its importance increased in the late 1950s and 
60s. Given the country’s demographic deficit but high potential for economic growth, labour 
shortages in the industrial sector necessitated the recruitment of foreign workers to Germany, 
leading to bilateral agreements with a number of Mediterranean countries such as Italy in 
1955 and Turkey in 1961. About 740,000 labour migrants from Turkey were recruited by 
German firms between 1961 and 1963 (Worbs 2003). Economic recession in the 1970s led to 
a halt on immigration in 1973. Since then, only immigration to achieve “family reunification” 
has been allowed, and  many  of the so-called  “guest  workers”  (Gastarbeiter) have settled 
permanently in Germany with their families. Refugees also have made up a large part of the 
immigrant inflow to date. During the war in the former Yugoslavia, more refugees came to 
Germany than to any other European country. In 1992, more than 400,000 refugees immi-
grated to Germany, while in 2003, there were  only 50,000 (Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung 2004; Tranoes and Zimmermann 2004).  
Furthermore, Germany is a special case in the sense that not all immigrants hold foreign citi-
zenship. In fact, during the second half of the 20
th century, about 20 percent of immigrants 
were  of  German  origin  (Maschke  2003).  The  so-called  “ethnic  Germans”  (Aussiedler/ 
Spätaussiedler) who came from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union automatically 
received German citizenship if they could prove German descent. The inflow of ethnic Ger-
mans of course increased dramatically after the fall of the Iron Curtain. At present, more than 
4.3 million ethnic Germans have returned to settle permanently in Germany, the largest group 
from the former Soviet Union (BVA 2003).  
A total of 7.3 million foreigners live in Germany, with people of Turkish and Yugoslavian 
origin comprising the largest groups (BAMF 2004).2 Due both to its current lack of qualified 
workers in technical fields and to the harmonization of immigration policies within the EU, 
Germany has been forced to make difficult decisions on its future immigration policy. In 
2004, the different political parties were finally able to agree upon and to vote in the new 
immigration law, which includes both new regulations on immigration and the recruitment of 
highly qualified workers, and also integration measures for immigrants. At the end of the 
                                                                        
2 About 26 % of the foreign citizens are of Turkish origin.  Discussion Papers   484 
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1980s, there was a high demand for specialists in the IT sector, and the so-called “Green 
Card” program opened the way for about 20,000 of these specialists to move to Germany 
between  2000  and  2003.  Only  14,144  temporary  work  permits  were  granted,  however 
(Tranoes and Zimmermann 2004). Recent developments in German immigration policy show 
that despite measures designed to attract highly skilled immigrants, in 2003, low-qualified 
seasonal workers made up the largest immigrant group, with about 90% of them working in 
the agricultural sector (Migrationsbericht 2004). At the European level, the member states are 
moving towards limiting the immigration of people who are not immediately “advantageous” 
to the society, letting only people in who can contribute directly to economic growth. The 
idea of installing checkpoints in the North African countries for individuals seeking asylum in 
one of the EU member states highlights the fact that Europe is becoming more and more a 
fortress.  
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Figure 1:  Inflows and outflows of foreigners to / from Germany 
between 1990 and 2003 
Source: Statistisches Bundesamt 2004 
 
As the figure above demonstrates, the number of immigrants of foreign origin decreased con-
tinuously between 1992 and 2003. Given the sharp restrictions on immigration, the inflow of 
foreign immigrants will never reach post-WWII levels despite the opening of borders to the 
East. The will of the German government to attract high skilled immigrants depends largely 
on the public opinion on immigration. According to results from the Flash Eurobarometer 155 
“Justice and Home Affairs”, less than one in two persons in Germany agree that the economy Discussion Papers   484 
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needs immigrants to work in some sectors (European Commission 2004). Furthermore, one in 
two persons in Germany agree that legal immigrants should have exactly the same rights as 
native Germans, against two in three persons on average in the EU15.  
Finally, not only are immigrants in Germany currently being subjected to negative stereotyp-
ing due to the ongoing political debate on how much immigration Germany can tolerate, they 
have also suffered outright racist attacks on repeated occasions over the last 15 years. In the 
1990s,  hundreds  of  Turkish  immigrants  and  asylum  seekers  were  victims  of  severe  hate 
crimes by right-wing extremist groups (Bade 1994).  
3  Explaining attitudes towards immigration 
Research on attitudes towards immigration in general and toward certain immigrant groups in 
particular is a vast field of sociological and political study, and some of the most important 
hypotheses formulated and empirically tested to date are briefly discussed in the following.  
The contact hypothesis, which is the most controversial, assumes that social contact between 
majority and minority groups reduces prejudice. However, this occurs only when contact is 
made under specific circumstances such as equal status, common goals, intergroup coopera-
tion and support from authorities (Allport 1954). More recently, Amir (1998) found in his 
study on intergroup relations that contact conditions are particularly important. Contact may, 
for example, lessen the stress between ethnic groups when based on cooperative activities and 
when occurring with higher-status people, and may thus lead to an improvement of one’s 
view of the other group. Inversely, contact based on competitive activities may have a nega-
tive effect on intergroup relations. Nevertheless, according to Amir, contact per se cannot 
always lessen conflicts. In fact, opponents to the contact hypothesis such as Studlar (1977) 
found that contact has no influence at all on racist attitudes in Britain.  
Hypotheses from the sociotropic literature deal with macro-level factors. These hypotheses 
assume that the perception that one’s country is experiencing economic recession and increas-
ing unemployment can make natives reluctant to accept immigration. In fact, there is no rea-
son why the overall effect of immigration on native employment is necessarily negative, but 
many people believe that this is automatically the case. In a cross-national analysis of 12 
OECD countries, Bauer et al. (2000) found for example that about 45% of German natives 
think that immigrants take their jobs. In the United States Espenshade and Hempstead (1996) Discussion Papers   484 
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studied the relationship between unemployment and attitudes of Americans toward immigra-
tion. Their study shows that higher annual unemployment rates lead to greater opposition to 
immigration. In contrast, those who believe in the power of the U.S. economy are especially 
likely to support higher levels of immigration. Citrin et al. (1997) also found a positive relation-
ship between pessimism about the national economy and anti-immigration opinion. They argue, 
however, that these judgments on the state of the national economy and their effect on opinion 
formation  may  in  fact  be  indirect  expressions  of  personal  concerns.  Comparing  nativism  in 
France, the US and Germany, Fetzer (2000) found that in contrast to France, perceptions of the 
national economy have no influence on attitudes towards immigration in Germany and the US.  
Some other researchers have highlighted the role of cultural motivations and concerns about 
the state of the nation in explaining opinions on immigration. Cultural threats may thus ex-
plain negative views towards immigration (see Sniderman, Hagendoorn, and Prior 2004 for 
the Dutch case). Furthermore Citrin and Sides (2004) found that Europeans who are attached 
to their nation are more reluctant to allow immigrants and refugees to enter their country.  
The present paper does not offer a revision of the contact hypothesis nor does it test the so-
ciotropic hypothesis in the German context. The influencing factors studied here are related to 
the impact of 1) individual dissatisfaction and social situation (deprivation / dissatisfaction 
hypothesis) and 2) self-interest (benefit / disutility hypothesis) on opinion formation.  
In Germany, research on pocketbook issues attempts to explain the voting behaviour of Ger-
mans, in particular voters for right-wing parties, through the influence of their social situation. 
In the literature on racism and xenophobia in Germany, it is argued that the conservative atti-
tudes of individuals are linked to their social situation: working poor and unemployed people 
and those belonging to lower social classes will thus tend to hold right-wing extremist atti-
tudes because they cannot adapt themselves to the social, cultural and economic change con-
fronting modern societies (Klein and Falter 1996). The assumption here is that the so-called 
losers of modernization tend to be more negative toward immigration. Furthermore opinion 
formation may also depend on people’s perception of their own everyday lives. This paper 
shares the assumption that people experiencing financial and job worries will tend to be more 
hostile toward immigration than those who feel financially secure and do not fear job loss.  
The benefit hypothesis underlines the effects of personal profit from immigrant labor – in 
particular services – on opinion formation. In Germany, many immigrants work in sectors like 
agriculture, construction, and gastronomy, and a large number of women with a migration Discussion Papers   484
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background are hired to care for children or to clean houses. As noted by Smith and Edmon-
ston (1997) with regard to the U.S. economy, the presence of immigrants in a country results 
in a reallocation of labor across different sectors, producing a fall of the price of the goods 
and services because of the lower overall price of immigrant labor. Their conclusion is that 
households benefit quite uniformly from lower prices due to immigrant labor, but that rich 
households with highly educated members benefit most. Household services and food are two 
of the commodities on the basis of which Smith and Edmonston analyse the share of con-
sumption  expenditures  attributable  to  immigrant  labour.  This  paper  also  assumes  that  the 
profit individuals derive from immigrant labour is translated into attitude patterns character-
ised by a higher acceptance of immigration. In addition, we will test the effect of disutility on 
opinion formation. 
4  Research method and data 
German natives’ acceptance of immigration is analysed here using data from the German 
Socio-Economic Panel SOEP (Wagner et al. 1993). The SOEP is a wide-ranging representa-
tive longitudinal study of private households. It provides information on all household mem-
bers, who may be Germans living in the old and new German federal states, foreigners and 
recent immigrants to Germany. The collection of panel data started in 1984 and in certain 
years,  the  questionnaire  has  focused  on  specific  additional  issues(Burkhauser  et  al.  1997; 
Schupp and Wagner 2002). In 2000, the survey was given to more than 12,000 households, 
with a total of more than 24,000 individuals.3 The dependent variable is derived from the 
question “What is your attitude towards the following areas - are you concerned about them? 
Immigration to Germany”.4 Possible responses are: very concerned / somewhat concerned / 
not concerned at all. As the dependent variable is an ordinal scale, ordered probit models are 
used. For the dependent variable, attitudes unfavourable to immigration are coded with higher 
values so that positive coefficients of the independent variable indicate a tendency to hold 
negative attitudes toward immigration. 
                                                                        
3 The Socio Economic Panel is becoming more and more analyzed by political scientists (e.g., Kroh and Zucker-
man 2004; Zuckerman 2005) 
4 The respondents are asked about their concerns in different fields such as criminality, environmental protection, 
job security, personal economic situation and general economic development. Discussion Papers   484 
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To test the dissatisfaction hypothesis, indicators on worries about one’s own financial situa-
tion and job security5 are used. The benefit hypothesis is tested first using two direct indica-
tors available in the SOEP data on 1) the frequency of dining out and 2) the regular employ-
ment of a maid in the household. Since many of the cheap restaurants in Germany are run by 
immigrants6, those who dine out frequently show average gains from immigration. House-
holds hiring a maid in Germany may also benefit from these price effects because many 
maids are of foreign origin.7 Because we do not observe whether respondents like to eat in 
restaurants owned by foreigners or whether the maid they employ is of foreign origin, our 
indicators are not totally perfect. But they are direct measures in the sense that they allow us 
to distinguish the well-educated respondents and those with high income and to see the effect 
of profiting from immigrant labor. The counterpart of the benefit hypothesis – the disutility 
hypothesis – is tested by using an indicator of possible disadvantage related to the high con-
centration of people of foreign origin in an area. It is assumed that parents whose children go 
to school with a large number of children of foreign immigrants will tend to be more negative 
toward immigration. Many German natives believe that a high share of students of foreign 
origin in their children’s schools affects the learning performance of native children nega-
tively.8  
Because the level of education can be assumed to affect employment status, occupational 
status, and the financial situation, it is controlled for in all statistical models. Demographic 
variables such as age, gender are also tested as predictors. In the model testing the profit from 
immigration, marital status is controlled for as the frequency of dining out, for example, is 
expected to be greater for those who are single and live alone. In order to account for the 
                                                                        
5 For employed respondents only. 
6 Mostly immigrants from the recruitment countries such as those of Italian, Turkish and Greek origin. 
7 An analysis with the SOEP-data indicates that about 4 Mio. households in Germany “employed” regularly or 
occasionally maid in the year 2000 (Schupp 2002). Furthermore, according to a razzia that was initiated in Frank-
furt among a total of 350 private households and apartments, about 60 % of them illegally employed maids of 
foreign origin (Alt 2004).  
8 What is in fact more problematic is the process of gentrification of some urban areas of Germany. The high 
concentration of students of foreign origin in some schools results partly from the fact that many middle-class 
families have moved away to areas that are not socially and economically disadvantaged.  Discussion Papers   484 
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regional differences in Germany that might affect opinions and competition on the labour 
market, dummy variables are created for each federal state and for the type of municipality, 
i.e. rural or urban, and introduced in all models.  
The results are based on the years 1998 and 2000 of the SOEP data. It was necessary in some 
cases to link the 2000 with the 1998 wave because information on the “dining out” indicator 
is only available for the year 1998. A total of 10,314 respondents holding German citizenship 
are available. German citizens born abroad are not included in the analysis because most are 
so-called ethnic Germans who are immigrants themselves. To test the effect of the concentra-
tion of foreign students on parents’ opinions toward immigration, only parents are included 
whose children responded the SOEP questionnaire at the age of 17.9 
5  Descriptive results  
Table 5.1 presents some descriptive statistics about opinions on immigration according to 
individual characteristics of the respondents. Negative attitudes toward immigration are less 
widespread among women, while immigration concerns are more widespread among German 
natives living in rural areas than among Germans living in larger cities.  
There is a much higher share of untrained, trained, or skilled blue-collar workers who con-
sider immigration to be a kind of threat than white-collar or self-employed workers or civil 
servants. About the half of the natives belonging to the category of the trained blue-collar 
workers are very concerned about immigration. This is approximately twice the level among 
the unemployed. People who do not worry about their economic condition or are not afraid of 
losing their job are less concerned with immigration issues than those who have no worries 
about these issues. Differences in the distribution of concerns about immigration can be seen 
between natives employing a maid in their household  (23.5% are very concerned about immi-
gration) and those who do not (32.5%). This may, however, be due to the fact that households 
employing a maid have higher incomes because they are better qualified and consequently have 
                                                                        
9 More precisely, parents whose children answered the youth questionnaire between the years 2000 and 2003. Discussion Papers   484
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a better occupational status.10 Concerns about immigration are more prevalent among parents 
whose children go to a school with a large share of foreign students.  
Table 5-1 
Descriptive statistics on concerns about immigration - (in %) 
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10 However, it should be noted here that, especially as far as the correlation between high education and positive 
attitudes towards immigration and immigrants is concerned, a factor which is hard to extract from data is that of 
group norms. In the spheres of the highly educated, for example within the university, people may think that 
immigration is a threat but they would not dare proclaiming it. Discussion Papers   484 
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Even if descriptive statistics reveal the outlines of possible causal effects between two variables, 
they are not sufficient to test hypotheses because higher education in particular affects the ob-
jective status as well as the opinions of individuals. Therefore we need a multivariate analysis in 
order to identify the impact of benefits and dissatisfaction on acceptance of immigration. For 
this purpose, ordered probit models were estimated here. They are presented in the following 
sections.  
6  Dissatisfaction and acceptance towards immigration 
According to the “modernization loser hypothesis”, respondents with a low status may hold 
more conservative views than higher-status respondents. The results presented in Table 6-1, 
Model I, indicate that unemployed people do not necessary perceive immigration as a threat 
to the country or themselves. Rather, natives who experience unemployment tend to hold a 
positive view of immigration, as the coefficient is negative and significant.  
Working respondents with lower status such as blue-collar workers tend to be more worried 
about immigration than respondents who are outside the workforce. Only the coefficient for 
employees holding a managerial function is negative (-0.163), which means that they have 
more positive opinions about immigration. Respondents with a high educational level tend to 
have positive attitudes toward immigration. However it should be noted that highly educated 
people answer the question on concerns about immigration as might be expected. Thus, posi-
tive  attitudes  toward  immigration  among  the  highly  educated  may  be  the  result  of  group 
norms and social control inside groups. Unfortunately, this could not be captured in the data.  
As mentioned above, subjective elements of individuals’ perceptions of their economic and 
social situation are added. The results in the second model (Model II) confirm this assump-
tion. Respondents with financial worries are also more likely to worry about potential immi-
gration flows. The fear of immigration is then partly related to the fears directly concerning 
individuals’ everyday lives. Respondents who work and fear job loss are significantly more 
likely to be reluctant toward immigration than respondents who work and do not fear job loss. 
The coefficient for civil servants, which was not significant in the first model, is significant 
and positive in the second model when we control for subjective indicators. Civil servants 
who are not confronted with unemployment risks because of strong job protection laws for the 
German civil service still tend to worry more about immigration when we control for financial Discussion Papers   484 
7 The impact of self-interest on opinion formation 
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and job security worries. Contrary to the findings of Fetzer (2000), who found that persons 
living in poverty in Germany tend to hold pro-immigrant attitudes, we find here that living in 
poverty has no impact on attitudes toward immigration. It can be concluded that deprivation, 
seen as a negative perception of one’s financial and job situation, has a negative impact on 
opinion formation about immigration, whereas living in poverty lacks statistical significance. 
Table 6-1 
Ordered-probit analysis of concerns about immigration Subjective and objective indicators 
of living conditions 
  Modell I  Modell II 
  Coefficients  t-Value  Coefficients  t-Value 
   
Subjective indicators  (Ref.: Not worried about financial situation) 
Worried about financial situation       0,357  (19,60)** 
  (Ref.: employed and not worried about job security 
Employed and worried about job security       0,176  (7,79)** 
Missing      0,126  (1,84)+ 
         
Age  0,005  (8,07)**  0,007  (9,90)** 
Sex    (Ref.: Men)  -0,051  (2,99)**  -0,054  (3,19)** 
Type of municipality   (Ref.: high density) 
Medium density   0,109  (5,50)**  0,108  (5,43)** 
Rural area  0,215  (7,42)**  0,207  (7,10)** 
Status Variables   (Ref.: Not in the workforce) 
Unemployed  -0,066  (1,92)+  -0,118  (3,30)** 
Unskilled blue-collar worker  0,210  (4,31)**  0,210  (2,72)** 
Skilled blue-collar worker  0,405  (9,70)**  0,353  (4,72)** 
Qualified blue-collar worker  0,320  (9,13)**  0,289  (4,07)** 
Independent worker  -0,062  (1,61)  -0,067  (0,92) 
Low Employee   0,080  (2,92)**  0,078  (1,17) 
High Employee   -0,163  (4,38)**  -0,136  (1,89)+ 
Civil servant  0,067  (1,44)  0,196  (2,53)* 
Education level  (Ref,: low education level) 
High education level   -0,328  (11,52)**  -0,313  (10,96)** 
Middle education level  0,002  (0,08)  0,009  (0,40) 
Live in poor household    (Ref.: No)  0,047  (1,51)  -0,006  (0,19) 
Observations  20352  20352 
Pseudo R²  0,02  0,04 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Source: SOEP 2000, only German natives respondents, 15 countries dummies as control vari-
ables 
 
7  The impact of self-interest on opinion formation 
First, the impact of the benefit indicators is tested without controlling for social status or liv-
ing conditions, and only regional and demographic predictors are used. We control also for 
the household context, this means if the respondents is single and lives alone in the household Discussion Papers   484 
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because it is expected that this may influence the activity of dining out whereas, families with 
children may not dine out so frequently. 
Table 7-1 
Ordered-probit analysis of concerns about immigration - Benefit from immigrant labour 
  Model I  Model II 
  Coefficients  t-Value  Coefficients  t-Value 
         
Benefit indicators         
Maid in the household (Ref,: No)  -0,259  (5,44)**  -0,160  (3,27)* 
Sometimes dining out (Ref: Never)  -0,082  (2,98)*  -0,041  (1,46) 
Frequently dining out  -0,128  (4,05)**  -0,061  (1,88)+ 
   
Age  0,002  (3,45)**  0,004  (4,07)** 
Sex (Ref.: Men)  -0,035  (1,54)  -0,025  (1,03) 
Single      -0,244  (4,96)** 
Type of municipality  (Ref.: high density) 
Medium density   0,151  (5,14)**  0,124  (4,21)** 
Rural area  0,240  (5,66)**  0,209  (4,88)** 
Status Variables  (Ref.: Not in the workforce) 
Unemployed      -0,110  (2,18)* 
Blue-collar worker      0,266  (6,24)** 
Self employed      -0,028  (0,49) 
White-collar worker      -0,006  (0,15) 
Civil servant      0,147  (2,13)** 
Education level  (Ref.: low education level) 
High education level       -0,296  (7,21)** 
Middle education level      0,030  (0,94) 
Household Equivalent income      -0,00007  (3,57)** 
Observations  9667  9667 
Pseudo R²  0,01  0,03 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Source: SOEP 1998 and 2000, only German natives respondents, 15 countries dummies as 
control variables 
 
Persons living in rural areas and in areas of medium population density are more likely to be 
worried about immigration than persons living in big cities, whereas immigrants usually settle 
in urban areas, and inhabitants of rural areas have less de facto contact with immigrants. In 
this context, the impact of the political debate on integration and immigration and the way the 
different parties frame the issue in the media should not be underestimated. The widely held 
image of immigrants as “aliens” is largely a product of the political and social discourse.11  
                                                                        
11 In this field, the framing theory can help explaining the influence of the media on opinion formation by looking at 
the issues which are put on the agenda, how this is done and, much more important, what the impact of issue 
framing may be (Snow/Benford 1988). Discussion Papers   484
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By controlling for federal states and types of area, the coefficient for persons in households 
regularly employing a maid is negative (-.259) and statistically significant, which means that 
having a maid in the household tends to have a positive impact on attitudes toward immigra-
tion (Table 7-1). Activities like going out and dining outside the home also significantly in-
crease the probability of having positive views about immigration.  
In the second model (Model II), economic factors are introduced as predictors in order to test 
the robustness of the benefit indicators by controlling for variables of social status that may 
influence attitudes as well as the frequency of dining out or the hiring of a maid in the house-
hold. The results indicate that aside from economic factors such as education, household in-
come, and occupational status, the benefit indicators still contribute to explaining positive 
attitudes toward immigration. The effect for respondents who only sometimes dine out disap-
pears when controlling for occupational status and education level, but employing a maid and 
dining  out  frequently  remain  significant  and  increase  the  probability  of  having  a  positive 
attitude toward immigration. Being unemployed has no significant effect on opinion forma-
tion, and only blue-collar workers and civil servants tend to have less accepting attitudes 
toward immigration. 
Table 7-2 presents tests of how the concentration of students of foreign origin at school af-
fects parents’ opinions on immigration. In the first model (Model I), the disutility coefficient 
is highly significant and positive (0.306), which means that native parents whose children go 
to schools with many children of foreign origin tend to have a negative view of immigration. 
When we control for social status, educational level, and the household financial situation 
(Model II), the significance of the disutility indicator decreases. But the share of foreign stu-
dents at school still has an impact on parents’ opinion formation.12  
 
                                                                        
12 On the contrary, Fertig and Schmidt (2002) found that a low share of foreigners in the area tends to result in 
more negative attitudes towards foreigners. But the indicator we use here on the concentration of migrants at 
school is a more direct one and thus more appropriate than the approximate indicator on the percentage of for-
eigners in the area. 
 
 




Ordered-probit analysis of concerns about immigration - Effect of the concentration of 
students of foreign origin in schools on the opinion of parents on immigration 
  Model I  Model II 
  Coefficients  t-Value  Coefficients  t-Value 
         
Disutility indicators  (Ref.: low concentration) 
High concentration of foreign students  0.306  (3.26)**  0.201  (2.08)* 
   
Age  -0.010  (1.54)  -0.002  (0.37) 
Sex (Ref.: Men)  -0.076  (1.12)  -0.172  (2.30)* 
Type of municipality  (Ref.: high density) 
Medium density   0.081  (1.01)  0.043  (0.52) 
Rural area  0.222  (1.77)+  0.162  (1.27) 
Status Variables  (Ref.: White-collar) 
Inactive      0.061  (0.51) 
Unemployed      0.016   (0.12) 
Blue-collar worker      0.162   (1.65)+ 
Self employed      -0.289   (2.34)* 
Education level  (Ref.: low education level) 
High education level       -0.593   (4.48)**  
Middle Education level      -0.124  (1.11)  
Live in poor household       0.075  (0.46) 
Observations  1167  1167 
Pseudo R²  0.02  0.04 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses  
+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%   
Source: SOEP 2000, only German natives respondents (parents), 15 countries dummies as 
control variables 
 
8  Discussion 
In this paper, two lines of argumentation were followed to explain attitudes toward immigra-
tion: the role of subjective deprivation on the one hand, and the role of benefits/disutility from 
immigration on the other. The important empirical findings relate mainly to the second argu-
ment. 
The results presented here indicate that worries about one's own financial situation have an 
impact on concerns about immigration. This could mean that in a country where poverty is 
persisting and becoming more acute, an increasing number of people may feel dissatisfied. In 
such a situation, a typical reaction for natives may be to seek a scapegoat, in this case the 
immigrant population, which they make responsible for their own discomfort. As the results 
of Bauer et al. (2000) indicate, many natives think that immigrants affect the national eco-
nomic and employment situation, although this is not factually true. The results concerning 
the opinion of parents toward immigration indicate  that the high concentration of foreign Discussion Papers   484 
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pupils has an impact on opinion formation on immigration when we control for occupational 
status, education level, and income level. The disadvantage in this case is that areas with a 
high concentration of immigrant families are mostly characterised by poverty and low in-
come. The middle-class families move away and the state institutions retire from those inner-
city neighbourhoods (Wilson 1987). So this situation is interpreted by many inhabitants as a 
disadvantage from immigration even if it is rather the result of class transformation of the 
inner-city. 
Benefits of immigration resulting from lower prices for goods and services can help explain 
the formation of opinions on immigration. According to the multivariate findings, respondents 
who derive economic benefits from immigration by using cheap household services and con-
suming cheap food outside the home are less worried about immigration flows even when 
social status variables are controlled for. Interesting is that the benefits derived from immigra-
tion influence the perceptions of the beneficiaries, creating patterns of action and belief char-
acterized by positive views toward immigration. People who profit from cheap immigrant 
labor by employing a maid or by dining out probably do not see immigrants as a direct threat 
to their own wellbeing. In this sense, the social status of those who benefit from the services 
immigrants offer is not at stake. However, one cannot argue that immigrants are more ac-
cepted by the native population when they sell their labor cheaper than natives and when they 
stay in low-status employment. In fact, one of the main objectives of any integration policy is 
equal treatment, enabling immigrants to enjoy the same chances to achieve high status and 
high income. This means that the factors contributing to the increase in social acceptance of 
immigration and immigrants lie in the receiving society itself and are not necessarily a func-
tion of the particular social status of immigrants and their families.  
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